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AND NEXT PLEASE? THE FUTURE OF
THE NLW DEBATE
Dr. Pauline M. Shanks Kaurin 1
Given the current face of emerging technologies in the
media, and given the lack of prominence of stories and
discourse about non-lethal weapons except in relation to
domestic policing issues, one might wonder what direction the
debate over non-lethal weapons as an emerging technology will
take. This piece is designed to move along the conversation and
think creatively and proactively about where the conversation
needs to go. While non-lethal weapons have their own unique
features, it is useful to frame the issues in terms of the
questions and ethical problems that these emerging technologies
raise, especially targeting, discrimination, and risk. Many of the
same ethical issues also apply to other emerging technologies,
framing a larger discourse about the future direction of war and
the evolving ethical implications.

Contents
I.

Introduction .......................................................................... 217

II.

Non-Lethal Weapons as an Emerging Technology ............... 219

III.

Ethical Ramifications of the Use of Non-Lethal
Weapons on the Battlefield ................................................. 222
A. Targeting.................................................................................... 222
B. Discrimination ............................................................................ 223
C. Risk ........................................................................................... 224
D. Impact ....................................................................................... 225
E. Long-Term Collateral Damage ...................................................... 226

IV. Conclusion ............................................................................... 226

I. Introduction
When reviewing the recent discourse on emerging technologies
and warfare in the popular press, several things immediately come to
the fore. First, there is the debate about the use of drones (Unmanned
1.

Dr. Pauline Shanks Kaurin holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Temple
University, Philadelphia, and is a specialist in military ethics, just war
theory, social and political philosophy and applied ethics. She is
Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pacific Lutheran University in
Tacoma, WA and teaches courses in military ethics, warfare, business
ethics and history of philosophy. Her most recent book is ACHILLES
GOES ASYMMETRICAL: THE WARRIOR, MILITARY ETHICS AND
CONTEMPORARY WARFARE (2014).
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Aerial Vehicles or UAVs) in the Global War on Terror, particularly in
relation to the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki and others in
Pakistan and Yemen. 2 While targeted killing can be, and has been,
conducted without drones, 3 the use of UAV technology has sharply
galvanized debate on the practice. 4 Part of the reason for this
sharpening may well be that such technology raises questions about
the increasing automation of warfare, and the extent to which humans
seem increasingly removed and remote in warfare. This physical and
psychological removal of combatants from the battlefield increases the
possibly of moving armed conflict toward full automation, raising
serious implications for the morality and laws of war, not to mention
the very nature of war itself.
Second, there are increasing concerns about cyberwarfare,
especially with regard to serious hacking threats from China 5 and
Iran, 6 in addition to threats from non-State actors. 7 In his discussion
of asymmetric warfare, Rod Thornton notes that China has been
quite explicit about its intention to use informational warfare,
disrupting important infrastructure and informational systems, to
cripple the U.S. military. 8 Indeed, these threats are serious because it
does not take a large threat in order to create a great effect. 9
Technology is absolutely integral to both the American Way of War
and the American Way of Life. The dependency of both the U.S.

2.

Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOR. REL. (May 23,
2013), http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627.

3.

See id.

4.

See generally, Ben Lerner, UAVs and Force: Current Debates and
Future Trends in Technology, Policy, and the Law, CTR. FOR SEC.
POL’Y (Oct. 23, 2013), http:// www. centerforsecuritypolicy. org/ 2013/
10/21/lerner_uavs-and-force/.

5.

See WILLIAM HAGESTAD II, 21ST CENTURY CHINESE WARFARE 9–21
(2012) (summarizing the cyberwar threat from official entities of the
Chinese government).

6.

See generally, Iranian Cyber Threat to the U.S. Homeland: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Counterterrorism and Intelligence and
the Subcomm. On Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Prot., and Sec. Techs.
of the Comm. On Homeland Sec. H.R., 112th Cong. (2012) (addressing
the concerns of Congress related to potential digital attacks from Iran or
allied non-state groups such as Hezbollah).

7.

See, e.g., McCaul Op-Ed: Hardening Our Defenses Against
Cyberwarfare, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 6, 2013), http://
homeland.house.gov/news/mccaul-op-ed-hardening-our-defenses-againstcyberwarfare-wall-street-journal.

8.

ROD THORNTON, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: THREAT
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 62–63 (2007).

9.

Id. at 63.
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military and civilian infrastructure on technology highlights the
vulnerability that such threats expose.
Third, there are various groups—Hamas, Islamic State (IS), and
al-Qaeda to name but a few—making extensive and effective use of
social media for recruiting purposes, to get their message out, and to
influence the actions of both state and non-state actors. 10 Twitter,
You Tube, Facebook, and other social media are the preferred
platforms, and were used by both Israel and Hamas during the recent
Gaza conflict, 11 as well as by IS, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates to
broadcast events like the execution of journalist James Foley. 12
Minority groups in Syria, Iraq, and various parts of Africa (such as
Sudan, Congo, and Nigeria) have also used social media to bring
attention to human rights abuses, such as potential or current ethnic
cleansing and genocide, to influence public opinion, debate, and
ultimately policy decisions at very high levels. 13
Given that this is the current face of emerging technologies in the
media, and given the lack of prominence of stories and discourse
about non-lethal weapons (NLW) except in relation to domestic
policing issues, one might wonder what direction the debate over
NLW as an emerging technology will take. This piece is designed to
move along the conversation and think creatively and proactively
about where the conversation needs to go. While NLW have their
own unique features, it is useful to frame the issues in terms of the
questions and ethical problems that these emerging technologies raise,
especially targeting, discrimination, and risk. Many of the same
ethical issues also apply to other emerging technologies, framing a
larger discourse about the future direction of war and the evolving
ethical implications.

II. Non-Lethal Weapons as an Emerging Technology
A core element of the debate surrounding NLW as an emerging
technology is whether NLW still qualify as an emerging technology or
10.

See, e.g. Jillian Kay Melchior, ISIS Tactics Illustrate Social Media’s
New Place In Modern War, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 18, 2014),
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/isis-tactics-illustratesocial-media%E2%80%99s-new-place-in-modern-war/ar-BB9gH4R.

11.

See, e.g. Jodi Rudorin, In Gaza, Epithets Are Fired and Euphemisms
Give Shelter, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2014), http:// www. nytimes.
com/2014/07/21/world/middleeast/in-a-clash-between-israel-and-gazaboth-sides-use-social-media-to-fire-epithets-and-hide-behindeuphemisms.html.

12.

See Melchior, supra note 9.

13.

See Global Agenda Councils: Emerging Technologies, WORLD ECON.
FORUM, http:// reports. weforum.org/ global-agenda-council-2012/
councils/emerging-technologies/ (last accessed Mar. 23, 2015).
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if they have passed into the realm of existing technologies. According
to the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, “Emerging
Technologies are ones that: arise from new knowledge of the
innovative application of existing knowledge; lead to the rapid
development of new capabilities; are projected to have systemic and
long lasting economic, social and political impacts; create new
opportunities for and challenges to addressing global issues and have
the potential to disrupt or create entire industries.” 14 While this
definition is not perfect, it addresses an essential point that there is
something transformative and potentially radical about the
technology relative to other technologies that are already present and
in use.
NLW have been used in various combat contexts since at least
the 1990s. Beginning with Somalia 15 and the former Yugoslavia,16
commanders requested NLW to address asymmetric armed conflict
situations that presented significant risks to civilian populations, such
as peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions, counterinsurgencies.
Commanders also requested NLW for use in conflicts where political
limits on combat action made having multiple levels and kinds of
force available essential to a successful mission, such as in Iraq in the
mid-2000s. 17 The question of what exactly constitutes a NLW is
complicated, but, generally, NLWs are not intended to kill,
permanently injure, or maim; rather, any effects are intended to be
temporary, minor, and reversible. 18 While some kinds of NLW have
been in existence for quite some time, the current generation of NLW
was first tactically employed by U.S. Marines in Somalia in the
1990s. 19 The U.S. Directorate on Non-Lethal Weapons was established
in 1996 to head up efforts by the Department of Defense to develop,
evaluate, and employ NLW in U.S. military operations. 20 At the
present time, NLW include low-impact bullets, foams, nets, lights,
noise, and gas grenades. Currently in development and testing are a
variety of other kinds of weapons, including: directed energy systems;
14.

Mike Treder, The Definition of Emerging Technologies, INST. FOR
ETHICS & EMERGING TECHS. (Dec. 6, 2010), http:// ieet.org/
index.php/Ieet/more/treder20101206.

15.

Pauline Kaurin, With Fear and Trembling: An Ethical Framework for
Non-Lethal Weapons, J. MIL. ETHICS 100, 102 (2010).

16.

See Linda D. Kozaryn, U.S. Troops in Bosnia Get Nonlethal Weapons,
U.S. DEF. DEP’T (Sept. 5, 1997), http:// www. defense. gov/ news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=41128.

17.

PAULINE KAURIN, THE WARRIOR, MILITARY ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY
WARFARE: ACHILLES GOES ASYMMETRIC (2014).

18.

See Kaurin, With Fear and Trembling, supra note 14, at 102.

19.

Id.

20.

Id.
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lasers; electromagnetic power to degrade equipment; light weapons;
sticky foams; pheromones; and vinyl nets deployed by mines capable
of stopping vehicles. 21 There is also progress on systems that can
disable or neutralize vehicles, optical distracters, focused acoustics,
Active Denial Technology (ADT), and laser induced plasmas. 22
The aim of all of these weapons is to provide increased flexibility
and response time on the part of military personnel, and to find ways
to neutralize a battlefield threat without having to resort to lethal or
less-than-lethal force. Advocates of NLW highlight their benefits in
environments like Iraq, which presented the following kinds of
situations: military units operating in urban or mixed areas where it
was not clear which individuals were combatants and which were noncombatants; at vehicle checkpoints where it was advisable to be able
to assess the intent of individuals and vehicles from a safe distance,
given the prevalence of IED and suicide bombing tactics; and in areas
where one wanted to lessen the impact of war on non-combatants to
help “win hearts and minds” so as to facilitate the restoration of
peace and foster long-term stability in the region. 23
Given the history and relatively slow development of NLW, with
limited funds and more limited political visibility than other
technologies, it seems that there are other technologies that better
qualify as emerging. This is especially true of long-lasting impacts and
new opportunities for impact on global issues if we think about how
these three technologies have driven public debate and policy concerns
over the last couple years. In the 1990s, NLWs were clearly emerging
in the sense of the definition above and were recognized as having,
potentially, a fairly radical effect on non-traditional military contexts
(peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and counter-insurgency).
During this period, the debates on NLW were significant and publicly
visible, with a few even raising the specter of the NLW as a substitute
for lethal force, constituting a possible revolution in military affairs. 24
However, the Department of Defense policy that emerged in the late
1990s clearly set strict parameters on their use and made clear they
were an augment to, and not a substitute for, lethal force, thus
maintaining the lethal force combat paradigm with an emphasis on
benefits for force protection. 25
21.

Id.at 102–03.

22.

Id. at 103.

23.

Id.

24.

Steven Metz, Non-Lethal Weapons, A Progress Report, JOINT FORCE Q.,
Spring/Summer 2001, at 18, 19.

25.

See LT. COL. TIMOTHY J. LAMB (USA), EMERGING NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR 21ST
CENTURY WARFARE 7 (1996).
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What is emerging about NLW, however, is the way in which they
have shaped the discourse around ethics and war in ways that also
apply strongly to other emerging technologies. First, NLW highlight
the risk averse and zero-casualty nature of contemporary, warfare,
especially asymmetric warfare. Second, they raise many of the same
issues found with other emerging combat technologies, especially in
terms of targeting and discrimination of non-combatants. Third, NLW
are emerging technologies in the sense that they can challenge and
change the standard military doctrine, lethal-combat-oriented force as
the dominant mode of war, requiring a rethinking role of lethality in
war.

III. Ethical Ramifications of the Use of Non-Lethal
Weapons on the Battlefield
In order to grapple with NLW as an emerging technology, it is
necessary to examine the following issues,: targeting the legitimate
object of war; discrimination between combatants and noncombatants; the level of risk necessary for war to be ethical, especially
on the part of combatants; the impact of these weapons on both
combatants and non-combatants; and the long term collateral
damage and impact of these technologies, aside from the
considerations of proportionality in the previous issue. These
particular issues need to be addressed because the principal arguments
leveled by proponents of NLW is that they do less harm, and that
any harm they do cause is more likely to be temporary and reversible,
especially relative to non-combatants, than the lethality paradigm.
However, this line of argument about mitigating and reducing harm,
like those about UAVs and targeted killing, is based primarily on
utilitarian considerations of effect and impact, which mask more
critical issues like targeting and risk. These two considerations, and
the shifts in ethical thinking they represent, do intersect with the
issues raised by targeted killing, UAVs, and the use of social media in
war because they circumvent the traditional combatant-oriented,
physical force/combat-based notion of war as circumscribed by jus in
bello and international law.
A. Targeting

The question of whom to target is a central factor regarding NLW
as an emerging technology. Some arguments suggest that because
NLW are non-lethal, then a force using NLW ought to be able to
target non-combatants since the harm is much less than that from
lethal weapons, and may be reversible. Unfortunately, this argument
confuses the issues of effect and discrimination, as Chris Mayer and
other have rightly indicated.. 26 When one targets non-combatants,
26.

See Kaurin, With Fear and Trembling, supra note 14, at 105.
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one: violates their rights; treats them as objects of war, to which they
have not consented; and violates the requirements under the law of
armed conflict for discrimination (discussed infra) and non-combatant
immunity. Therefore, the intentional targeting of non-combatants,
regardless of how minor the resulting harm might be, is radically
problematic to any ethical and humane conception of war. Being
treated as an object of war is itself a very serious harm.
It may also be problematic to target combatants with weaponry
against which they would not have a reasonable chance of making a
response or mounting a defense. In particular, certain chemical and
other non-ballistic weapons are designed to blind the victim, effect the
victim’s nervous system, or alter the victim’s consciousness to
compromise the victim’s ability to function and defend themselves. 27
This is not to say that symmetry of weaponry is required, but the
rules of war and international law have, for good reason, placed
restrictions on what kinds of weapons and tactics can be used; in
particular, they bar anything that causes unnecessary suffering or
compromises human dignity. 28 A combatant is still a human being
and ethical warfare requires recognition of this fact.
Noting these points, targeting objects and infrastructure with
NLW that would otherwise be legitimate targets of lethal force seems
much less problematic. Indeed, targeting with NLW might be more
desirable, as it would render these objects unusable only in the short
term, while avoiding the kind of long-term destruction that makes the
restoration of peace and jus post bellum considerations so difficult.
This kind of approach truly can challenge the destruction–as-lethality
paradigm of warfare (if one can think about destroying a bridge as
killing it), transforming the nature of warfare and strongly impacting
global issues.
B. Discrimination

The questions about targeting return us to the question on how
forces are supposed to discriminate and between combatants and noncombatants. This question is especially problematic in fluid situations
and where distance is an issue, as NLW (like UAV) are designed to
increase distance between combatants and those they are
encountering. As noted earlier, those arguments in favor of NLW by
insisting that NLW render discrimination moot are morally
problematic. Discrimination must be maintained regardless of how
minor the harm or impact is.

27.

See Current Non-Lethal Weapons, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
PROGRAM,
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/CurrentNonLethalWeapons.aspx
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015).

28.

See Kaurin, supra note 14, at 102, 106.

223

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
And Next Please? The Future of the NLW Debate

If discrimination is to remain as an element of the use of NLW,
then the analysis of discrimination must focus on the basis upon
which it is to occur. Recently, Jeff McMahan and other revisionists
have made arguments undermining the basis of the Moral Equality of
Combatants argument. They argue that not all combatants are
ethically equal; rather, that some combatants are unjust and therefore
are subject to force, whereas just combatants are not. 29 This argument
has thus far been applied only to combatants, but it seems that it also
has rippling implications for non-combatants and, in particular, the
protections of non-combatant immunity. Under this theory, there may
be unjust non-combatants that one might argue ought to be targeted
in virtue of their “unjust” cause. Just as with the arguments against
the moral equality of combatants, such arguments face serious
epistemological hurdles and involve shifting the basis of discrimination
to guilt and innocence relative to the cause of the war, as opposed to
consent, threat, or membership in a protected category. 30 To say that
such a move is problematic and controversial is to dramatically
understate the case.
Implementing discrimination on the ground still has its practical
problems, even after clarifying the basis of the discrimination. Much
like drones, NLW increase the size of the battlefield, making
discrimination determinations more difficult and complicated than
those determinations made in conventional combat. Therefore, these
emerging technologies actually make discrimination more important
and complicated, not less, and users of NLW must carefully address
the discrimination concerns going forward.
C. Risk

Underlying the concerns regarding targeting and discrimination is
the critical question of risk distribution, relative to both force
protection for combatants and to risk imposed upon non-combatants
While risk is omnipresent in armed conflict, what is less clear is
whether there is a minimum level of risk that combatants have a
moral obligation to bear in war, and what the moral status of conflict
activities is in non-war situations.
While reasonable force protection is a legitimate concern, forces
encounter a serious moral problem that speaks directly to the nature
of war when the impetus to force protection is motivated by a zero
casualty mentality and pressure for the bloodless war. War is different
from massacre and the crime of murder in important ways having to
29.

See Jeff McMahan, On the Moral Equality of Combatants, 14 J. POL.
PHIL. 377, 379 (2006).

30.

See id. at 383–84 (detailing the debate between implied consent due to
the circumstance of war and the actual consent by just or unjust
combatants to be engaged in war).
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do with the risk the combatants take, the danger that they are
expected to endure in return for wielding lethal force (largely without
sanction provided it is within certain parameters), and the protections
afforded non-combatants who are not subject to the same risks and do
not have the same tools to defend themselves. 31
There is a moral argument to be made for keeping death and
injury to the absolute minimum necessary for the military objective
(which accords with the Proportionality of Means principle in the
Just War Tradition), but—and this is a large caveat—if this is
achieved by transferring or increasing the risk to non-combatants, the
moral claim cannot be justified. Once again, non-combatants have not
consented to be objects of war. To put non-combatants at increased
risk is to treat them as objects of war, which ultimately erodes noncombatant immunity. Combatants, on the other hand, are objects of
war and have consented to (or at least acknowledge) that they are
under lethal threat and can, and will, be targeted, which is why they
have weapons and the right to return this lethal force. This risk
comes with combatancy and war.
D. Impact

The impact of NLW in armed conflict is the final and most visible
element of the NLW analysis, and must occur after addressing the
earlier issues of targeting, discrimination, and risk. Much of the
discussion and debate surrounding NLW focuses on the impact of
non-combatants and the potential that NLW have to be less harmful,
in particular to reduce collateral damage by giving the military more
options than lethal force and ways to de-escalate situations so as not
to lead to lethal force. While NLW clearly can do some harm, if they
do less net harm than conventional weaponry, it seems that the
discourse around collateral damage and the Doctrine of Double
Effect 32 would support their use because it would reduce the amount
and impact of any unintentional harm to non-combatants. That said,
there are serious questions about how to measure and assess the
impacts of NLW. Testing on humans is problematic, and individuals
with distinct characteristics of health, age, gender, and body type
seem to react differently to the same agent or weapon, which makes
assessing the potential harm resulting from NLW use more difficult
than with lethal force.
The impact of NLW on combatants remains a serious issue,
especially to consider whether NLW are more humane and cause less,
or more, reversible kinds of harm than conventional lethal weapons. If
31.

Kaurin, supra note 14, at 108.

32.

Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL’Y
(Winter 2014), http:// plato. stanford. edu/ archives/ win2014/
entries/double-effect/.
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there are weapons that actually cause more harm (especially in terms
of proportionality of means 33), this is seriously problematic. This is to
some degree analogous to the debate about the use of UAV possibly
putting ground troops at more risk, or generating more resistance
from the adversary on the ground, because of how these weapons
impact the perception adversaries have of their opponents’ courage
and willingness to sacrifice for their cause. 34 Even if these technologies
seems to save lives in the short term, they may be problematic in
other, more long-term and big-picture, ways that change how to think
about the impact of these weapons.
E. Long-Term Collateral Damage

Finally, it is critical to think through the long-term, unintended
consequences for the use of these weapons that fall outside the
calculations related to above-mentioned collateral damage, especially
in terms of jus post bellum considerations. What are the long-term
impacts for jus post bellum if all sides make use of these weapons, as
often happens since emerging technologies rarely remain the domain
of only one party for long? How does the use of these technologies
inform the perception that non-combatants have of the involved
parties, and what is the impact on the restoration of peace after the
combat concludes? There are clear parallels between the UAV and
targeting killing debates and the consideration of winning hearts and
minds, in terms of perceptions of the nation using UAV, risk aversion,
and also providing recruitment and resistance for the adversary., That
adversary can make the argument that a state using UAV is
cowardly, will not fight, and only needs to endure a conflict long
enough to be victorious. 35 Even if NLWs cause less harm and seem
more humane in the short term, long-term and jus post bellum
considerations may ultimately suggest such emerging technologies are
not the best, most ethical choice.

IV. Conclusion
From the discussion of these issues, NLWs are an emerging
technology, not so much in the sense of the technology itself, but
more in the nature of the ethical challenges and the power of how
society answers or addresses those challenges to have the kinds of
transformative and disruptive impacts alluded to in the definition of

33.

Kaurin, supra, note 14 at 101.

34.

Christian Enemark, The End of Courage? How Drones Are
Undermining Military Virtue, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/04/24/3744693.htm.

35.

Id.
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NLW supra. 36 While the focus on targeting and discrimination does
not really change or disrupt the lethality paradigm, or the moral
requirements presumed to go with it, the discussions of risk, shortterm impact, and long term impact have the potential to challenge
that paradigm, at least to the degree that states think of lethality
being the ultimate determiner of victory in warfare.
Like UAVs, cyberwar, and social media, NLWs raise questions
about how close to the battlefield one has to be in order to be
engaged in the conflict, as well as how society is to think about the
categories of combatant and non-combatant. All these technologies
also give the individual, as opposed to a conventional military unit,
more ability to escalate, de-escalate, and manage situations that can
lead to conflict, undermining the idea that war and success in war are
necessarily tied to physical combat and battle. To the degree that
NLWs and other emerging technologies raise issues that challenge this
picture of the nature of war and how it is fought, they have
tremendous potential to impact and challenge how society addresses
global issues of conflict, disrupt the defense industry with its focus on
combat and lethal force, and cause rethinking of the role of warfare as
a means of political action. But this conversation has only begun, and
there is much left to be said.

36.

See Treder, supra note 13.
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